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Although  a growing  body  of  economic  work  has looked  at the role  of pro-social  motives  to
explain  self-selection  into  public  or not-for-proﬁt  sector  jobs,  in particular  in the  delivery
of social  services,  no attention  has been  given  to  the role  of pro-social  preferences  in
the  decision  to take  up posts  in rural  and  isolated  areas.  Yet  there  are  reasons  to  believe
that such choices  involve  a degree  of  self-sacriﬁce,  in particular  in  developing  countries
where  rural  regions  typically  combine  geographic  hostile  environment,  high  levels  of
poverty,  low  educational  opportunities,  limited  access  to basic  services  and  worse  career
opportunities.  On  the  other  hand,  as  shortage  of qualiﬁed  staff  is higher  in  rural  areas,  the
returns  on  the  presence  of  a  health worker,  and  the  beneﬁts  to  the  populations,  are  likely
to  be  higher.  Using  data  from  a longitudinal  study  of  nurses  in  South  Africa  this  paper  tests
this hypothesis  by  linking  experimental  measure  of pro-social  preferences  and  revealed
preferences  outcomes.  Three  measures  of  pro-social  preferences  are  constructed  based  on
donations  made  by study  participants  in  a  dictator  game  played  at baseline.  Job  choices  are
observed  three  years  later  for  more  than  97%  of  the  initial  sample.  We  show  that the  more
dedicated  the  nurses  –  measured  by their  generosity  towards  patients  in  the  dictator  game
– the  more  likely  they  are  to have  chosen  a rural  job.  This  result  is robust  to  the  inclusion
of  various  demographic  controls  and to different  econometric  speciﬁcations.  This  ﬁnding
contributes  to  the literature  on  role  of  pro-social  values  as  an intrinsic  motivation  factor
in labour  supply  decisions  and  it has policy  implications  for the provision  of  social  services
in  difﬁcult  settings.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Moving away from the traditional emphasis on purely selﬁsh motives, a growing body of work has investigated the role
played by pro-social preferences on individual decisions (see Meier, 2006 for a review). In relation to labour supply decisions,
some attention has been paid to the role of pro-social preferences to explain the self-selection of individuals into the public
sector or into not-for-proﬁt organisations, in particular in the delivery of social services (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Delfgaauw,
2007; Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2008; Kolstad and Lindkvist, 2012; Serra et al., 2010). However, no attention has been given
to the role of pro-social preferences in the decision to take up particular positions associated with low material welfare for
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 207 927 2090; fax: +44 207 927 2701.
E-mail address: Mylene.Lagarde@lshtm.ac.uk (M.  Lagarde).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.004
0167-2681/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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he worker and high beneﬁts for others, beneﬁting from the worker’s presence. Yet if workers care about the beneﬁts they
ring to social service beneﬁciaries (e.g. patients, pupils), they might be willing to trade off some of their own  welfare against
he additional welfare recipients derive from having access to public services.
Rural jobs of social sector in low- and middle-income countries typically ﬁt this deﬁnition. Rural communities typically
ace challenging social and economic environment often exacerbated by isolation, extreme weather conditions, lack of public
ransport, difﬁculty of access to and limited choice of goods and services. Empirical evidence suggests that public goods, such
s roads or health facilities, can generate welfare gains in rural areas (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002). Even when infrastructure
uch as hospitals, roads or schools are available, access to public services remains poor in rural areas as governments typically
truggle to recruit and retain qualiﬁed staff in such posts (Dussault and Franceschini, 2007; Mulkeen and Chen, 2008). There
re many reasons why teachers, nurses or doctors are reluctant to be deployed in rural areas. Living in a rural isolated area
ompared to an urban one is associated with reductions in objective as well as subjective welfare (Fafchamps and Shilpi,
009). Working conditions can also be harder in rural areas due to professional isolation, and professional advancement
ore limited as access to training and networking opportunities is more restricted (Hedges, 2002).
Governments have used various strategies to encourage public servants to take up rural jobs. In health for example,
any countries have imposed mandatory services in rural settings in exchange for subsidising nursing or medical studies
Frehywot et al., 2010). More frequently, ﬁnancial incentives in the form of bonus payments, subsidised housing or hard-
hip allowances have been used (Mulkeen and Chen, 2008; Sempowski, 2004). Recognising instead that there might be
ome heterogeneity in the opportunity cost of working in rural areas (Hammer and Jack, 2002), some governments have
ought to train as professionals individuals who are more likely to accept rural jobs at a later stage, for example by offering
cholarships to increase the recruitment of graduates originating from rural areas (Grobler et al., 2009; Ross and Couper,
004).
This paper tests whether pro-social preferences predict the choice of more altruistic positions. Using data from a panel
f South African nurses, we are able to test whether generous behaviours observed in framed dictator games (DG) played
t baseline, are associated with the choice of rural jobs, where health workers are able to help more needy people at the
xpense of their own personal welfare. Using decisions made by nurses played during the baseline survey, we  construct
hree distinct measures of pro-social preferences: a generic measure of altruism (donation to a peer); a measure of pro-poor
ttitude (donation to a poor person) and a measure of nurses’ professional dedication (donation to a patient). We show
hat a higher dedication to patients is associated with an increased probability of taking up a job in a rural remote area.
his result is robust to the inclusion of key socio-demographic variables generally associated with preferences for rural
obs, to different constructions of the dependent variable and dedication measure, and to various econometric speciﬁca-
ions. On the other hand, we ﬁnd weak evidence that a pro-poor attitude in the DG is associated with rural job choices,
nd no evidence of the effect of generosity towards one’s peer. We  ﬁnd these results consistent with the idea that dedica-
ion measures social service providers’ willingness to sacriﬁce their well-being to increase the marginal beneﬁts of service
eneﬁciaries.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature, and Section 3 describes the South African
ontext and Section 4 the data used in the paper and the empirical strategy used. Section 5 reports the results and Section
 presents different robustness checks. Section 7 brieﬂy discusses the results and their implications.
. Related literature
.1. This paper is related to four different strands of the literature
First, this study contributes to the literature on the role of pro-social motives in the labour market, in particular with regard
o sorting of individuals into particular types of jobs. Besley and Ghatak (2005) ﬁrst proposed that matching employers and
mployees with similar missions or objectives can reduce the need for extrinsic incentives. Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and
elfgaauw and Dur (2008) further argue that due to the utility they derive from their contribution to the provision of public
oods, altruistic or pro-socially motivated individuals are less sensitive to extrinsic incentives than self-interested ones, and
ence self-select into less lucrative but pro-socially oriented public sector jobs. More closely related to the argument made
n this paper, Delfgaauw (2007) shows that “dedicated” doctors1 tend to self-select into the jobs (public sector ones) for
hich the marginal beneﬁt they provide to patients is greater. In their model, this conclusion derives from the hypothesis
hat public sector patients are poorer than private sector ones, so that the utility of seeing a doctor for free in the public
ector is greater than seeing the same doctor in the private sector. In this study, we  add to this literature by proposing
hat pro-social motives can act as a sorting mechanism in the choice of jobs located in challenging areas characterised by
oor amenities, if the pro-social preferences of service providers is speciﬁcally targeted at service beneﬁciaries – that is
f they care about the marginal beneﬁts their action will provide to service recipient. We  argue that in a context where
here is a lack of public service providers in rural areas, the marginal beneﬁt derived by rural populations from the presence
f a provider is greater than that of urban populations. Therefore “dedicated” workers are more likely to choose rural
osts.
1 Deﬁned as those doctors who have in their utility function a patient’s marginal beneﬁt derived from the care they provide.
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Few empirical studies have tested the relationship between pro-social motives and job choices, partly due to the difﬁculty
to ﬁnd suitable measures of pro-social preferences. A large number of empirical studies comes from the ﬁeld of political
science (public administration) and psychology, and show a positive association between self-reported survey measures
of pro-social behaviours and choosing public jobs (Perry and Wise, 1990). A couple of economic studies have used work-
related behaviours as indicators of pro-social behaviours: Rotolo and Wilson (2006) show that public sector employees
tend to undertake more volunteer work, while Gregg et al. (2011) ﬁnd that public servants do more unpaid overtime work.
Recently, efforts have been made to improve the measures of pro-social motives by using decisions made in experimental
economic games and triggered by actual ﬁnancial incentives (Camerer and Fehr, 2002). Two  studies closely related to this
paper have sought to test empirically whether health care providers displaying more pro-social motivations in economic
experiments are likely to be more attracted to public (Kolstad and Lindkvist, 2012) or not-for-proﬁt (Serra et al., 2010) jobs.
In a study of actual job choices made by doctors and nurses in Ethiopia, Serra et al. (2010) test the predictions of Besley
and Ghatak (2005) that workers with more pro-social orientations will seek like-minded employers, which are identiﬁed
as not-for-proﬁt employers (NGO) in their context. Using panel data, they link actual job choices to proxies of pro-sociality
measured at baseline by the amount of money returned in a trust game. They show that greater pro-social motivation is
associated with a higher probability of working for an NGO. However, their result is not robust to the inclusion of a dummy
controlling for the fact that some health workers were trained in NGO institutions. This raises questions about the potential
endogeneity of pro-social attitudes, which might in fact be linked to a nurturing process during training. Seeking to test the
predictions of Delfgaauw (2007) in Tanzania, Kolstad and Lindkvist (2012) ﬁnd that nursing and medical students who report
an intention to work in the public sector when they graduate also display more altruistic decisions in two  economic games (a
dictator game and in a trust game). However, their results may  not have been robust to a more comprehensive multivariate
analysis2 and only rely on stated preference for public jobs (not actual choices). Our study adds to this body of work by using
three different measures of pro-social motives obtained in framed dictator games, and linking them to job choices observed
in follow-up surveys. The diversity of pro-social preferences measured allows us to reﬁne the analysis made by previous
papers, by showing that what explains job choices best is primarily nurses’ willingness to dedicate themselves to patients.
Another body of work relevant to this paper is the health literature looking at the factors associated with the choice of
rural jobs by health care providers (see for example the reviews of Laven and Wilkinson, 2003; Lehmann et al., 2008 or Wilson
et al., 2009). This evidence suggests that having a rural upbringing and having been exposed to rural areas through training
increases the likelihood of being in a rural post. Other factors such as gender, ethnicity, family constraints have sometimes
been found to be relevant. However, this evidence based on cross-sectional studies potentially suffers from selection bias.
Finally, we are aware of only one study that sought to examine the association between pro-social motives and rural job
choices (Serneels et al., 2007). Serneels et al. (2007) ﬁnd that nursing and medical students in Ethiopia who say that helping
the poor is the most important job attribute state that they would accept a lower reservation wage to work in a rural area.
Our study takes this previous study further by using more robust outcome variables (actual rural job choices) and measures
of pro-social motives (derived from economic games).
Finally, this paper adds to the limited literature testing one aspect of the external validity of experimental measures, by
testing whether measures of social preferences obtained in the lab predict actual behaviours of the same individuals obtained
in real settings. Although limited, this literature ﬁnds strong positive correlations between other-regarding preferences in
the lab and other-regarding preferences in real life (Cooper and Kagel, 2013). For example Karlan (2005) showed that
behaviour in trust games predicted repayment of loans to a Peruvian group lending micro-ﬁnance programme. In another
example, Carpenter and Seki (2011) show that pro-social behaviour of ﬁshermen crew in a public good game (measured
as conditional cooperation and disapproval of shirking) relates to higher productivity in ﬁshing, which by its very nature
involves cooperation between workers on a given boat.
3. Institutional setting
3.1. Rural and urban areas in South Africa
In developing countries, rural and isolated regions are sometimes referred to as “poverty traps” (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002),
as they display a combination of geographic hostile environment, high levels of poverty, low educational achievements,
worse health conditions, and limited access to basic services (Kanbur and Venables, 2005). This is not untrue in South Africa
where rural areas3 are plagued by multiple challenges, some of which are a lingering legacy of the formal policies of spatial
separation enforced under the Apartheid regime.
2 Descriptive statistics of the small sample used (N = 67) show that women are also more likely to choose public jobs, which may  be a confounder of
altruistic motives.
3 In South Africa there is no standardised deﬁnition or criteria of what a “rural area” is. There have been some attempts to develop deﬁnitions, including the
use  of population densities, sizes of towns, characteristics of the infrastructure or predominance of agriculture. In its report on urbanisation and migration,
Statistics South Africa deﬁned ‘rural’ on the basis of a number of indicators available in Census data, including whether an area fell under a traditional
authority, whether it was located outside of the metros and whether it lacked ‘urban characteristics’ such as availability of amenities and infrastructure. It
estimated that 43.7% of South Africa’s population was rural. As a result of this lack of consensus, it was  decided to ask participants to qualify the environment
where  they work in terms of rurality.
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Rural South Africa includes a majority of household with low level of education, limited income and with limited access
o arable and grazing land, creating food insecurity (Statistics South Africa, 2008). In addition, although since 1994 many
fforts have been made to improve access to public sector services in previously under-funded and systematically dis-
dvantaged ‘homeland’ areas, access to affordable, good quality services is limited in rural South Africa. Data from the
ecent census shows that there is a higher proportion of households with no access to clean water and toilet facilities in
ural areas (Statistics South Africa, 2012). Similarly, residents of North West and Limpopo, two of the most rural provinces,
ave the lowest access to health professionals of different categories, while the residents of the urban provinces of Gau-
eng and Western Cape have the best access (Day and Gray, 2010). Due to geographic barriers, cost of access to services
s higher in rural areas, with opportunity costs adding to the cost of scarce transport to cover large distances. For exam-
le, 15% of poor rural households still live more than an hour away from the closest clinic and 20% live more than an
our away from the closest hospital (Gaede and Versteeg, 2011). Partly as a result of these poor economic and social
onditions, health outcomes in rural areas tend to be worse than in urban ones. In 2007, infant mortality rates were
ound to be 71.2 per 1000 live births in rural areas compared with 43.2 per 1000 live births in urban areas (Bradshaw,
008). Comparing urban and rural provinces, the maternal mortality ratio is three times worse in rural Free State than it
s in Gauteng (the best performing, urban, province), and a person with tuberculosis (TB) in Gauteng has a 19.9% higher
hance of being cured than a person with TB in the North-West, a rural province (Gaede and Versteeg, 2011). Internal
igration is another factor driving poor health, as the healthier economically active populations migrate to the urban
conomic centres to work, but return to their rural homes if they fall ill to be cared for by their family (Clark et al.,
007).
However, deprivation and extreme poverty also exist in urban South Africa. In fact, with the end of discriminatory controls
n access to the cities, urban poverty has grown since 1994, with an increasing proportion of the poor relocating to urban
reas (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). Therefore urban centres include large pockets of extreme poverty, with people living in dire
onditions in informal settlements in the formerly segregated townships (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). Yet, access to amenities
nd public services remains generally much better in urban areas (Statistics South Africa, 2012), as distance does not act as
 barrier and provision of public goods is generally ﬁne.
.2. The nursing labour market
At the end of the Apartheid era, the South African health system was  characterised by inequalities in coverage and quality
f services, where white population groups were beneﬁting from good quality services in urban centres, whilst certain
eographic areas (in particular rural ‘homeland’ areas) were systematically under-funded (Coovadia et al., 2009; Ntsaluba
nd Pillay, 1998). Despite major reforms and investments to improve public sector health care services and increase access
o basic health care for all, South Africa still displays a fragmented system. Today, the private sector is almost exclusively
ocated in urban areas and serves the wealthier 15% of the population covered by private health insurance, and some 20%
ho sometimes seek primary care out-of-pocket. Therefore the public sector serves the majority and poorer part of the
opulation (McIntyre et al., 2007), and virtually acts as a unique provider of health care in rural areas.
A combination of several factors contributes to make public posts less attractive than private ones. Chronic under-
tafﬁng, high workload, low recognition from management and sometimes violence in the workplace has led to low morale
nd sometimes burnout (Ehlers, 2003; Erasmus, 1998; Erasmus and Brevis, 2005; Penn-Kekana et al., 2005; Shisana et al.,
003). These challenging conditions in public posts tend to be worse in rural settings where under-stafﬁng is more acute
han in urban settings, as the government is struggling more to recruit and retain qualiﬁed staff and ﬁll vacant positions
SANC, 2008). In rural areas, small teams of health professionals are also more vulnerable to staff turnover, with the loss of
ne professional having a large impact on service delivery and the workload of staff remaining in place (Reid et al., 1999).
he inadequate stafﬁng levels compounds the challenges of poor quality of equipment and infrastructure, as the quality of
ublic health infrastructure sometimes reﬂects the level of deprivation of rural areas. For example, a study on primary care
acilities in four rural districts found that only 22.5% of facilities had access to safe drinking water, 65% had electricity, 57.5%
ad ﬂush toilets and 12.5% had operational telephone (Schoeman et al., 2010). With regards to working conditions, there
s evidence of greater lack of resources, insufﬁcient equipment or poorly maintained buildings which are also reasons why
urses leave their posts in rural areas (Hall, 2004; Mokoka, 2007). A recent study also showed that nurses in rural South
frica are dissatisﬁed with pay and work conditions, the latter including stafﬁng levels, availability of equipment and work
pace (Delobelle et al., 2011).
Ill-conceived closures of nursing training institutions coupled with ageing and emigration of the nursing population
ave led to a shortage of nurses in the short-run in the South African labour market, estimated between 14,000 and 21,000
rofessional Nurses (Wildschut and Mqolozana, 2008). As shown in Fig. 1, the lack of professional nurses (and medical
octors) is widespread in the public health care system with numerous vacancies in all provinces of the country, both
ural and urban. Several government initiatives have sought to attract and retain public sector nurses. In 2004, the Depart-
ent of Health introduced signiﬁcant ﬁnancial incentives in the form of a Rural Allowance, giving a 8% salary increase
o nurses in rural posts. In 2008, to make public jobs as competitive as private ones, the government introduced a gen-
ral salary increase for public servants which resulted in an increase of nurses’ salary by 24% (Department for Public
ervice and Administration, 2008). Finally, mandatory community service for nurses was introduced in 2008, requiring
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Fig. 1. Vacancy rates for nurses and doctors in the public sector, by province. Note: EC: Eastern Cape, FS: Free State, GP: Gauteng, KZN: KwaZulu-Natal, LP:
Limpopo, MP:  Mpumalanga, NC: Northern Cape, NW:  North West, WC:  Western Cap.
Source: Health System Trust based on ﬁgures from the Personnel Administration System.
all nursing students who graduate to serve in a public facility for a year before they are ofﬁcially registered as Professional
nurses.4
A similar unmet demand for nurses exists in the private sector even though it already employs 40% of nurses (Breier et al.,
2009). Due to their difﬁculties to recruit nurses in the local market, private hospital groups have launched several initiatives
to recruit foreign professional nurses (e.g. from India) for multiple-year contracts (Wildschut and Mqolozana, 2008).
Professional nurses are exclusively trained by public nursing colleges or universities, and nursing studies are largely
subsidised by the government. After they have successfully completed their four years of training, graduating nurses have
to complete a one-year community service before they are ofﬁcially registered with the Nursing Council.5 In addition, those
who have received bursaries for their studies from local provinces are required to remain in post in these provinces an
additional amount of time (varying between 1 and 1.5 year). As a result of the high demand for nurses in all areas in the
countries (both in the public and private sector), once they have completed their public service requirements, Professional
nurses are virtually free to choose where they want to work. Posts are opened and advertised by provinces (for public posts)
and private sector providers, and nurses can apply anywhere.
4. Data
4.1. Nurse panel survey
We  use data from a longitudinal study of nurses from South Africa. The baseline survey was conducted between August
and October 2008 with ﬁnal-year nursing students who were about to graduate and enter the labour market. The sampling
strategy aimed at selecting nursing students who  would differ in their potential exposure to rural jobs and rural life. First,
two provinces were selected, a rural one (the North-West province) and an urban one (Gauteng province).6 In each province,
three nursing colleges and one university7 were selected, and all ﬁnal-year nursing students (n = 578) were invited to take
part in the study. A total of 377 agreed to participate.8
All nurses who took part in the original baseline survey were followed up over time by telephone. To limit the risks
of attrition, nurses were initially contacted every three to six months, with annual contacts in the last two years. During
4 In addition, some nurses who have obtained bursaries to support them during their nursing studies have to remain in the public sector until the end
of  a pre-agreed contract (typically an additional 6 months to a year on top of their community service). These bursaries may  apply to both rural and urban
jobs.
5 This registration is necessary to apply to any job as a Professional Nurse in South Africa.
6 In Gauteng, only 4% of the population lives in rural areas, while 59% does in the North-West province (Kok and Collinson, 2006).
7 While most nurses are usually training in nursing colleges, universities also have nursing degrees, although they are smaller programmes, and their
content is sometimes more academic and less oriented towards clinical practice.
8 This 65.2% response rate goes up to 76.7% if one excludes the ﬁrst nursing college where data collection was organised on the same day as the end-of-year
student party (which meant that only 37 students out of the 135 ﬁnal years participated in the study).
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Table  1
Employment destination of nurses at follow-up.
Urban Rural Total %
Nursing jobs 244 109 343 93.2%
Public  sector, SA 193 106 299
Private sector, SA 36 3 39
Overseas 5 0 5
Other jobs 15 5 20 5.4%
Finishing community servicea 1 1
Nurse jobs in a prisonb 1 2 3
Occupational nursing in private companies 4 4
Non-nursing jobsc 10 2 12
Not  working 5 5 1.4%
Studying 3 3
Unemployed 2 2
Total 254 114 368 100%
a One nurse took several years to pass her exams and, as a result, her career path was delayed.
b We excluded these individuals from the analysis sample, on the ground that this is a restricted nursing job, in which nurses will not be able to provide
health care to a large population. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these three individuals.
c That includes jobs in laboratory services (n = 6), administrative jobs in private-not-for-proﬁt companies (n = 2), research jobs (n = 2), administrative
positions for private health insurance companies (n = 1), in a pharmacy (n = 1).
Table 2
Locations of nurses’ jobs.
Deep rural Rural village Small town in
a rural area
Small town in an
urbanised area
Large town City Total
Public sector 17 37 51 67 40 87 39
Based  in health centres/clinic 14 34 30 41 18 19
Based in hospitals 3 3 21 26 22 68
Private sector 1 2 6 10 20 299
Based  in health centres/clinic 0 1 0 1 3 2
Based in hospitals 0 0 2 5 7 18
Overseas 5 5
Based  in hospitals 5 5
t
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oTotal  17 38 53 73 50 112 343
%  5.0% 11.1% 15.5% 21.3% 14.6% 32.7% 100%
hese telephone interviews, very brief questionnaires were administered, mainly to ask about their occupational status. By
ovember 2011 we had information on the occupational status of 97.3% (n = 368) of the original sample.9
.2. Job and location choices
Table 1 shows the work status of the 368 nurses who could be traced up three years after the baseline survey. While the
ajority (81.3%, n = 299) still work as nurses in the public sector four years after their graduation, 1.4% (n = 5) have left the
ountry, 10.6% (n = 39) work in the private sector, while a small number (5.4%, n = 20) are either not working, or have taken
p non ‘traditional’ nursing jobs.10 We  restrict the analysis of job choices to those individuals who still work as nurses,11 so
 total of 343 individuals.
In addition to their occupational status, we asked respondents to describe the area in which they were working. They
ere asked to choose one of the following categories: “deep rural village”, “rural village”, “small town in a rural area”, “small
own in an urbanised area”, “large town” or “city”. Table 2 below shows that only 31% of respondents work in a rural area as
eﬁned by the ﬁrst three categories. The breakdown of posts by type of facilities shows that the majority of rural posts are
n small health centres, although there are 29 nurses working in a hospital in a rural area.
Based on these data, two dependent variables are created. The ﬁrst one is a dummy  variable that takes the value 1 if
he nurse reported that her job was located in one of the three rural categories. The second dependent variable takes the
alue 1 when the nurse works in a rural health centre. This second variable reﬂects the idea that jobs in rural health centres
re more likely to cumulate two characteristics: health centres are often in areas more remote than hospitals and are less
9 Since the baseline survey, ﬁve nurses had deceased; three had been lost to follow-up and one refused to continue to be part of the study.
10 The model and analysis here focuses on the decisions made by nurses wanting to provide care to patients in health facilities. Therefore we have excluded
rom  the analysis those individuals who have chosen less classic nursing jobs (e.g. occupational health in ﬁrms). The results remain the same if we  include
hem.
11 In addition to providing a more comparable population, this also limits the endogeneity problem that could arise from including individuals who  chose
ccupations (e.g. laboratory jobs or research jobs) only available in urban areas.
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staffed, meaning that holding a job there means that one is the primary point of contact for the surrounding population
(whose alternatives are close to none).
4.3. Measures of pro-social preferences
To measure their pro-social preferences, nursing graduates were invited to take part in a double-blinded dictator game
(DG) during the baseline survey. The DG is a simple behavioural economic game where participants are given an endowment
to split between themselves and someone else (Forsythe et al., 1994). As decisions in a double-blinded DG are unconfounded
by strategic or reputational concerns,12 a strictly self-interested dictator should allocate nothing to the recipient. Therefore,
the proportion of money given to the recipient is typically interpreted as a measure of pro-social preferences or altruism
(Camerer, 2003; Camerer and Fehr, 2002).
Abandoning some degree of abstraction and framing the DG by providing speciﬁc information about recipients can be
useful to elicit more speciﬁc other-regarding preferences (Aguiar et al., 2008; Bran˜as-Garza, 2006; Eckel and Grossman,
1996), in particular when seeking to understand the determinants of decision-making in a real-world context. In this study,
nursing students interviewed at baseline played the role of the dictator and were asked to divide13 R100 (approximately £6.6
at that time)14 between themselves and a recipient in three DG where the recipient was  framed differently. To avoid wealth
effects, only one game was selected randomly at the end of the session to be paid. In one game, to measure nurses’ dedication
towards patients, recipients were identiﬁed as patients. To get a standard measure of altruism as traditionally deﬁned in an
anonymous DG, recipients were identiﬁed as another student in another DG. Finally to elicit a pro-poor attitude, recipients
were deﬁned as poor people in a third game.15
We  expected the pro-social measures elicited through these three DGs to be more or less directly relevant to, and therefore
correlated with, the career choices observed in the labour market. Speciﬁcally, we expected the proportion of money sent to
patients to be a direct measure of the extent to which nurses are willing to sacriﬁce their own  welfare for patients, which is
the speciﬁc variation of pro-social preference we are interested in here. Generosity towards poor people is likely to capture
some other aspect of pro-social preferences, which may  not necessarily be relevant to the career choice of nurses. First, it
is less directly relevant to nurses’ jobs: a lot of poor individuals do not necessarily require health care, and not all patients
treated (including in the public sector) are poor. Second, there are many ways of helping or being generous towards poor
people for nurses, other than in their work, while this is less true for dedication towards patients. Finally, generosity towards
one’s peer, although it denotes some form of willingness to give to others, should be the least relevant to job choices outside
the lab. Indeed, although instructions were extremely clear about the lack of reciprocity in the game and the anonymity of
the donation, when recipients were identiﬁed as other nursing students dictators’ generosity might have been driven by
more self-serving motives through a process of identiﬁcation with the recipient.16 Hence we  can expect that this decision
in the lab is likely to be less relevant to career choices.
Overall, the three measures of pro-social attitudes provide a unique opportunity to test the link between real-world and
experimental decisions, with an expectation that some experimental decisions are more relevant to real-world choices.
In keeping with good practice, the DGs were conducted according to a precise script that was  developed prior to data
collection,17 and implemented, as far as was practically possible, by the same researcher in an attempt to limit any potential
experimenter bias. Strict experimental procedures were established, forbidding communication between participants and
ensuring that the choices made in the DG could not be seen either by fellow study participants or by the researchers present
in the room.18
4.4. Econometric strategy
To test the role of pro-social preferences in the choice of rural jobs, we  estimate the following equation with a Probit
model:RURALi = ˇ0 + ˇ1PROSOCIALi + ˇ2RUR BORNi + ˇ3RUR STUDYi + ˇ4SAL + ˇ5Xi + εi
where RURALi is the binary outcome of interest for job choice, PROSOCIALi is the experimental measure of pro-social motives,
RUR BORNi is a dummy  variable taking the value 1 if the individual was born in a rural area; RUR STUDYi is a dummy  variable
12 Individual decisions remain unknown to the experimenter and recipients are not aware of the identity of their benefactor.
13 They could split the money in eleven different ways (0% for the recipient, 10%, 20%, . . .,  100%).
14 In keeping with the practices established by experimental economists in the ﬁeld in developing countries, the stake of the game was  determined by
the  daily wage of a beginning nurse.
15 Payoffs to recipients were made at the end of the study. Students associations and charities were used to identify students, patients and poor people,
and  make the various donations.
16 This explanation was  clearly expressed by some participants in a few focus group discussions after the survey (e.g. “I thought about what I would want
to  receive if I was  the recipient”).
17 Detailed instructions can be found here: http://www.wits.ac.za/ﬁles/9mcsh 259483001359383601.pdf.
18 Researchers in charge of calculating the payoffs were in a separate room and payoffs were returned at the end of the data collection in a sealed envelope
showing only participants’ study numbers.
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taking the value 1 if they studied in the rural (North-West) province; SAL is a variable controlling for the (log) monthly wage
of the nurse in her job. Xi is a vector of demographic controls including age, gender, ethnic background, marital status, a
dummy  variable equal to 1 if the individual’s ﬁrst choice of study was  related to health professions and ﬁnally survey-based
variables capturing attitudes towards rural areas and job-related values. Finally εi is the usual idiosyncratic error term.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides a summary of the main variables of interest for the population analysed in this study. As expected in
a nursing population, the proportion of male students is relatively low (13.4% in 2011 vs. 14.3% in 2008 for the baseline
population). The majority of study participants are black/African (89.8% vs. 89.3%). The mean age was  31.3 years in 2008,
and just fewer than 50% of participants said they were born in rural areas.
On average, nursing students decided to share 34.7% with a fellow student, 37.9% with a patient and 53.4% with a poor
person. Fig. 2 shows the distribution of these three donations. The distributions of gifts made to patients and even more to
students are right-skewed, denoting that many nurses have kept most of the money for themselves. By contrast, there are
more generous behaviours (giving away 50% or more) when recipients are poor people. These differences are conﬁrmed by
Fig. 3 which reports the cumulative distribution functions of the three different games. This graph clearly shows the more
generous decisions adopted by study participants when recipients were poor people.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variable name Description Obs Mean SD Min  Max
Pro-social motives
Donation to patient % of endowment sent to patient in DG 343 0.38 0.21 0 1
Donation to poor % of endowment sent to poor in DG 343 0.53 0.25 0 1
Donation to peer % of endowment sent to nursing student in DG 343 0.35 0.20 0 1
Job  characteristics
Rural Works in a rural area 343 0.32 0.47 0 1
Rural  health centre Works in a rural health center 343 0.23 0.42 0 1
Salary  Monthly salary (log) in Rands 337 9.17 0.26 7.31 10.09
Socio-demographic and education characteristics
Male Male 343 0.13 0.34 0 1
Black  Black 343 0.90 0.30 0 1
Born  rural Born in a rural area 343 0.48 0.50 0 1
Age  Age (in 2008) 343 31.27 7.73 21 56
Married Married (in 2008) 343 0.31 0.46 0 1
At  least 1 child Has one child or more (in 2008) 343 0.63 0.48 0 1
Trained rural Studied in rural (North-West) province 343 0.41 0.49 0 1
Health  vocation 1st choice of study related to health 343 0.60 0.49 0 1
Attitude to income Attitude towards income a 343 0.26 0.44 0 1
Attitude to rural Attitude towards rural areas b 343 −0.03 1.52 −2.35 4.08
a Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if, when looking for a job, respondents place ﬁrst “a good income so that you do not have any worries about
money”.
b Score created with Principle Component Analysis based on agreement (on a 6-point Lickert scale) with the following statements: “Working in rural
areas  is not stressful at all”; “Quality of life in rural areas is very good”; “The lifestyle you have in rural areas appeals to me”; “The social life in rural areas
is  enjoyable”; “Living in a city is stressful” (recoded).
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Fig. 2. Distribution of choices in the dictator games played with study participants.
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Table 4
Dedication towards patients and rural job choices.
Any job in a rural area Job in a rural health centre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donation to patient 0.254** 0.263* 0.275** 0.230** 0.226** 0.240**
(0.129) (0.138) (0.139) (0.103) (0.105) (0.104)
Born  rural 0.290*** 0.279*** 0.286*** 0.156*** 0.134*** 0.129***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.057) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Trained  rural 0.438*** 0.451*** 0.461*** 0.372*** 0.373*** 0.382***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.048) (0.050) (0.051)
Salary 0.020  0.014 0.116 0.116
(0.110) (0.110) (0.083) (0.082)
Health  vocation −0.012 −0.006 −0.021 −0.022
(0.057) (0.057) (0.044) (0.043)
Age 0.008* 0.007* 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Male 0.028  0.014 0.053 0.037
(0.081) (0.080) (0.066) (0.064)
Black 0.178** 0.190*** 0.143*** 0.145***
(0.072) (0.068) (0.035) (0.033)
Married 0.097  0.102 0.080 0.080
(0.066) (0.067) (0.052) (0.052)
At  least one child −0.063 −0.062 −0.055 −0.052
(0.073) (0.073) (0.057) (0.057)
Attitude to income 0.127* 0.108*
(0.071) (0.057)
Attitude to rural −0.006 0.005
(0.018) (0.013)
Observations 343 337 337 343 337 337
Log-likelihood −146.7 −137.1 −135.2 −133.1 −123.8 −121.5
Pseudo  R2 0.313 0.352 0.360 0.281 0.325 0.338
Notes: All regressions are probit. Dependent variables are dummy variables for holding a job in a rural area, either in a hospital or in a health centre (columns
1–3)  and holding a job in a rural health centre (columns 4–6). Donation to patient represents the proportion of money given by the respondent to a recipient
identiﬁed as “a patient” in a dictator game played at baseline. Results present the marginal effects of each factor, or the marginal impact of each predictor
on  the probability of working in a rural area (columns 1–3) or on the probability of working in a rural health centre (columns 4–6). Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Observations vary due to missing data for the salary variable. Signiﬁcance levels:
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table  5
Pro-poor attitude and rural job choices.
Any job in a rural area Job in a rural health centre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donation to poor 0.057 0.098 0.101 0.140 0.181** 0.182**
(0.107) (0.115) (0.116) (0.086) (0.085) (0.084)
Born rural 0.280*** 0.271*** 0.280*** 0.153*** 0.130*** 0.128***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.057) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
Trained rural 0.436*** 0.452*** 0.461*** 0.381*** 0.387*** 0.394***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.054) (0.049) (0.051) (0.052)
Salary (log) 0.028 0.019 0.121 0.117
(0.111) (0.111) (0.082) (0.081)
Health vocation −0.006 0.001 −0.013 −0.013
(0.057) (0.057) (0.042) (0.042)
Age 0.008* 0.008* 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Male 0.019 0.007 0.053 0.039
(0.080) (0.080) (0.065) (0.063)
Black 0.179** 0.191*** 0.149*** 0.151***
(0.073) (0.069) (0.032) (0.030)
Married 0.098 0.104 0.076 0.075
(0.066) (0.067) (0.051) (0.051)
Has  at least 1 child −0.064 −0.064 −0.064 −0.063
(0.073) (0.074) (0.057) (0.057)
Attitude to income 0.118* 0.100*
(0.070) (0.055)
Attitude to rural −0.010 0.000
(0.018) (0.013)
Observations 343 337 337 343 337 337
Log-likelihood −148.5 −138.5 −136.8 −118.4 −123.9 −121.9
Pseudo R2 0.305 0.345 0.353 0.216 0.325 0.336
Notes: All regressions are probit. Dependent variables are dummy  variables for holding a job in a rural area, either in a hospital or in a health centre (columns
1–3)  and holding a job in a rural health centre (columns 4–6). Donation to poor represents the proportion of money given by the respondent to a recipient
identiﬁed as “a poor person” in a dictator game played at baseline. Results present the marginal effects of each factor, or the marginal impact of each
predictor on the probability of working in a rural area (columns 1–3) or on the probability of working in a rural health centre (columns 4–6). Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Observations vary due to missing data for the salary variable. Signiﬁcance levels:
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.2. Nurses’ dedication towards patients and rural job choices
Table 4 reports the marginal effects of several Probit estimations with the two different dependent variables deﬁned
arlier, with proportion of money sent to a patient (“dedication” towards patients) as the pro-social preference measure of
nterest. The results show consistent evidence of a positive association between dedication and the choice of a rural job. An
ncrease in the donation made to patients in the DG by 10% translates to an increase in the probability of choosing a job in a
ural area by 2.54–2.75 percentage points. A similar positive effect is found on the marginal probability of choosing a job in
 rural health centre (between 2.26 and 2.40 percentage points).
Other demographic variables traditionally associated with a preference for rural jobs are also signiﬁcant. Being born in
 rural area increases the probability to take up a rural job (in a health centre) by 28.6 (12.9) percentage points. Similarly,
aving trained in the more rural province (North-West) increases the probability of being in a rural job (in a health centre) by
6.1 (38.2) percentage points. In addition, we also ﬁnd that being black/African19 and being older increases the probability
f working in rural areas. Surprisingly a positive attitude towards rural lifestyle, expressed in 2008, is not associated with
he choice of rural jobs.
.3. Pro-poor generosity and rural job choices
Table 5 reports the marginal effects of several Probit estimations of the link between pro-poor attitude and rural job
hoices. We  ﬁnd no evidence supporting a link between a greater generosity towards poor people in the DG and holding
ny job in a rural area. However, there is some evidence that a pro-poor attitude in the DG is associated with holding a
ob in a rural health centre. More speciﬁcally, an increase in the donation to a poor person in the DG by 10% is associated
19 As opposed to other ethnic groups usually used in South Africa: white, Indian, coloured. This result is probably driven by the fact that all white nurses
n  the sample work in urban areas.
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Table  6
Altruism towards peers and rural job choices.
Any job in a rural area Job in a rural health centre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donation to peer 0.148 0.106 0.135 0.042 0.039 0.045
(0.135) (0.147) (0.149) (0.106) (0.109) (0.109)
Born  rural 0.279*** 0.268*** 0.278*** 0.147*** 0.125*** 0.122***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.057) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
Trained  rural 0.434*** 0.447*** 0.457*** 0.367*** 0.367*** 0.374***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.048) (0.050) (0.051)
Salary  (log) 0.037 0.029 0.135 0.133
(0.112) (0.112) (0.084) (0.083)
Health  vocation −0.009 −0.002 −0.015 −0.015
(0.057) (0.057) (0.044) (0.043)
Age 0.008* 0.007* 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Male 0.016  0.005 0.041 0.027
(0.080) (0.080) (0.065) (0.062)
Black 0.174** 0.186*** 0.145*** 0.147***
(0.075) (0.070) (0.036) (0.034)
Married 0.102  0.109 0.084 0.083
(0.066) (0.067) (0.052) (0.052)
Has  at least 1 child −0.058 −0.058 −0.050 −0.049
(0.073) (0.073) (0.057) (0.057)
Attitude to income 0.122* 0.100*
(0.071) (0.056)
Attitude to rural −0.011 0.002
(0.018) (0.013)
Observations 343 337 337 343 337 337
Log-likelihood −148.0 −138.6 −136.8 −135.5 −126.1 −124.2
Pseudo  R2 0.307 0.344 0.353 0.268 0.313 0.323
Notes: All regressions are probit. Dependent variables are dummy variables for holding a job in a rural area, either in a hospital or in a health centre (columns
1–3)  and holding a job in a rural health centre (columns 4–6). Donation to peer represents the proportion of money given by the respondent to another
nursing student in a dictator game played at baseline. Results present the marginal effects of each factor, or the marginal impact of each predictor on the
probability of working in a rural area (columns 1–3) or on the probability of working in a rural health centre (columns 4–6). Standard errors are reported
in  parentheses. Observations vary due to missing data for the salary variable. Signiﬁcance levels:
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
with an increase in the probability of working in a rural health centre by about 1.82 percentage points. The effects of other
socio-demographic variables reported for the results of Table 4 also apply to the estimations reported here, with the most
important effect found for the training location, followed by respondents’ rural backgrounds.
5.4. Altruism towards peers and rural job choices
Table 6 reports the association between a generic measure of altruism from the DG (donation to other nursing students)
and choice of rural jobs. Unlike what we found in the previous two  speciﬁcations, there is no evidence that a greater generosity
towards one’s peers is predictive of a choice of rural jobs, either in general or in a health centre. This result gives additional
support to the idea that it is not just altruism in the lab in general, but a willingness to sacriﬁce one’s beneﬁts for speciﬁc
groups of individuals (patients, poor) that is likely to shape nurses’ decisions outside the lab.
5.5. Testing simultaneously the role of all pro-social motives
Table 7 reports the results of regressions testing the simultaneous role of the three measures of pro-social motives
providing further evidence on the relative explanatory power of each measure. While we  do not favour these speciﬁcations
due to unsurprising issues of collinearity between some of the measures (in particular the correlation between donations to
patients and donations to poor people is 0.613),20 they conﬁrm the better explanatory power of the decisions to give money
to patients in the lab. Indeed, only this measure of pro-social motive is found to be signiﬁcant in predicting the choice of
rural job choices.
20 The other two correlation coefﬁcients are:  peer/poor = 0.267;  peer/patient = 0.360.
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Table  7
Simultaneous role of pro-social motives and rural job choices.
Any job in a rural area Job in a rural health centre
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Donation to patient 0.312* 0.298* 0.218* 0.182
(0.169) (0.177) (0.133) (0.130)
Donation to poor −0.114 −0.053 0.047 0.104
(0.136) (0.145) (0.106) (0.103)
Donation to peer 0.071 0.049 −0.059 −0.051
(0.146) (0.158) (0.113) (0.113)
Born rural 0.288*** 0.285*** 0.158*** 0.130***
(0.052) (0.057) (0.045) (0.045)
Trained rural 0.431*** 0.459*** 0.376*** 0.389***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.049) (0.053)
Other controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 343 337 343 337
Log-likelihood −146.3 −135.1 −132.9 −120.9
Pseudo R2 0.315 0.361 0.282 0.341
Notes: All regressions are probit. Dependent variables are dummy  variables for holding a job in a rural area, either in a hospital or in a health centre (columns
1–2)  and holding a job in a rural health centre (columns 3–4). Donation to patient/poor/peer represents the proportion of money given by the respondent
to,  respectively, a patient/a poor person/another nursing student in a dictator game played at baseline. Results present the marginal effects of each factor, or
the  marginal impact of each predictor on the probability of working in a rural area. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Controls include dummies
for  being born in a rural area, having trained as a nurse in a rural province and having had a health-related ﬁeld/profession as ﬁrst choice of study, monthly
(log)  salary, age, male, black, married, having a child, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent places income as the ﬁrst thing to look for in a
job,  and a synthetic index capturing positive attitude towards rural lifestyle. Signiﬁcance levels:
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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.1. Alternative measures of pro-social preferences
Using the proportion of money sent to recipients as a measure of pro-social preference falsely assumes a linear relationship
etween the strength of pro-social motives and the probability of choosing a rural job. Not only is this not necessarily
rue, but it is difﬁcult to test since this metric of pro-social preferences was built on the 11 ways of splitting the initial
ndowment imposed to participants in the DG. In addition, part of a donation in the DG might reﬂect something different
rom other-regarding preferences, for example “warm glow” (Andreoni et al., 2007) or some experimenter effect (Levitt
nd List, 2007). By contrast, one could argue that donating half of one’s original endowment or more in the DG displays
 stronger altruistic disposition towards the recipient. Therefore to test that our results are robust to this problem, we
reate two alternative series of pro-social measures. First we create a dummy  variable equal to 1 if an individual shares
0% or more of their initial endowment in a DG. Second, to further test the non-linearity of pro-social motives, we  create
 series of three dummy  variables corresponding to three levels of generosity deﬁned according to the donations in each
G: low (shared 30% or less of one’s endowment), medium (shared between 40–50%) and high generosity (gave 60% or
ore).21
The new results, presented in Table 8, concur with our previous ﬁndings and support the link between relevant measures
f pro-social preferences in the lab and career decisions outside the lab. Results from the speciﬁcations using the binary
ariable (columns 1–3 and 7–9) show that sharing half or more than one’s endowment with patients in the DG is associated
ith an increase in the probability of choosing a job in a rural area (in a rural health centre) by 17.4 (10.7) percentage points.
haring half or more than one’s endowment with a poor person in the DG is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in the
robability of choosing a job in a rural health centre (by 7.1 percentage points), but there is no evidence of effect on the
robability of choosing any rural job. Looking at non-linear effects of pro-social motives towards patients and poor people
columns 4–5 and 10–11), one ﬁnds that in general the positive association between altruism in the lab and rural job choices
utside the lab is driven by the more extreme generosity of some individuals who share 60% or more of their endowment.
s before, we ﬁnd that altruism towards peers is not associated with the choice of rural jobs, with any of the alternative
easures of altruism towards one’s peers (columns 3, 6, 9 and 12).21 We also ran speciﬁcations including individual dummies for all 11 possible ways of splitting the initial endowment, but this produced inconsistent
esults  given the small and uneven numbers of individuals in each of the 11 categories.
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Table  8
Non-linearity in pro-social motives and rural job choices.
Any job in a rural area Job in a rural health centre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Gave ≥50% to patient 0.174*** 0.107**
(0.063) (0.049)
Gave ≥50% to poor 0.012 0.071*
(0.059) (0.039)
Gave ≥50% to peer −0.003 −0.025
(0.057) (0.042)
Gave 40–50% to patient 0.075 0.088**
(0.061) (0.045)
Gave  ≥60% to patient 0.193* 0.117
(0.108) (0.090)
Gave  40–50% to poor 0.081 0.076
(0.084) (0.062)
Gave  ≥60% to poor 0.130 0.161**
(0.091) (0.073)
Gave  40–50% to peer 0.029 0.041
(0.059) (0.043)
Gave  ≥60% to peer 0.012 −0.041
(0.159) (0.088)
Controls All All All All All All All All All All All All
Observations 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337
Log-likelihood −133.1 −137.2 −137.2 −135.3 −136.1 −137.1 −121.5 −122.7 −124.1 −122.1 −121.1 −123.6
Pseudo  R2 0.370 0.351 0.351 0.360 0.356 0.351 0.338 0.331 0.324 0.334 0.340 0.327
Notes: All regressions are probit. Dependent variables are dummy  variables for holding a job in a rural area, in any health care facility (columns 1–6) and
holding a job in a rural health centre (columns 7–12). Measures of pro-social motives are dummy  variables for sharing at least 50% of the initial endowment
(columns 1–3 and 7–9), and two  dummy  variables for sharing 40–50% or 60% or more of the initial endowment (columns 4–6 and 10–12). Results present
the  marginal effects of each factor, or the marginal impact of each predictor on the probability of working in a rural area. Standard errors are reported
in  parentheses. Controls include dummies for being born in a rural area, having trained as a nurse in a rural province and having had a health-related
ﬁeld/profession as ﬁrst choice of study, monthly (log) salary, age, male, black, married, having a child, a dummy  variable indicating whether the respondent
places income as the ﬁrst thing to look for in a job, and a synthetic index capturing positive attitude towards rural lifestyle. Signiﬁcance levels:
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
6.2. Self-selection of altruists into rural jobs or skilled workers into urban jobs?
There is evidence showing that incremental returns to an urban environment are greater for high skilled workers than
for those with lower skills (Glaeser and Resseger, 2010). One of the reasons is that the cost of living in cities acts as a self-
selection mechanism: high ability workers choose to live in a high cost city, and low ability workers are mainly located
in a low cost environment. This issue is only a problem if we assume that higher-skilled nurses are also less pro-socially
motivated, and that dedication towards patients acts like a default strategy for those who cannot get high returns from their
skills, so instead “choose” to get higher returns differently.
We cannot test that assumption directly as there is no information available in the data to create a measure of nurses’
skills. But urban areas will attract more high-skilled workers only if salaries are relatively ﬂexible so that high-skilled workers
will indeed earn more. This may  not be possible for early career nurses in the public sector, where salaries are centrally set,
and rapid and signiﬁcant promotions highly unlikely to occur at such an early stage in nurses’ career. By contrast, the private
sector offers more ﬂexible salaries that are likely to reﬂect skills better. High-skilled nurses are therefore likely to self-select
into private jobs. Therefore, if excluding private sector nurses from the sample is likely to leave us with a more homogenous
nursing population in terms of skills.
Therefore, we re-estimated the full models restricting the sample to nurses working in the public sector, to see if dedication
towards patients still had an impact on rural job choices. The results presented in Table 9 provide evidence supporting the
existence of the self-selection mechanism of altruistic individuals towards patients and poor in the lab into the more difﬁcult
rural jobs. Looking at predictors of the choice of a rural job in any type of facility (columns 1–3), the effect of a pro-social
attitude towards patients established in the whole population (see Table 4), is no longer signiﬁcant in this sub-group (p = 14.6).
However, the determinants of working in a rural health centre (columns 4–6), presumably a more difﬁcult and isolated post
that also provides great beneﬁts to patients in the catchment area show consistent results with those observed in the full
sample. They conﬁrm that dedication towards patients in the lab is positively associated with holding a job in a rural health
centre (column 4), as is a pro-poor attitude (column 5), and the size of these effects in the population of public sector nurses
is the same as, or larger than those observed in the full sample.
These results provide evidence supporting the idea that the self-selection mechanism of altruists into more difﬁcult jobs
is not just the default strategy employed by those individuals who  cannot get better jobs elsewhere.
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Table  9
Pro-social motives and rural job choices amongst public sector nurses.
Any job in a rural area Job in a rural health centre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donation to patient 0.236 0.243**
(0.162) (0.123)
Donation to poor 0.147 0.243**
(0.134) (0.101)
Donation to peer 0.225 0.079
(0.174) (0.131)
Born rural 0.314*** 0.313*** 0.309*** 0.162*** 0.165*** 0.156***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Trained rural 0.515*** 0.524*** 0.521*** 0.415*** 0.437*** 0.414***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 298 298 298 298 298 298
Log-likelihood −119.4 −119.8 −119.6 −111.0 −110.0 −112.7
Pseudo R2 0.383 0.380 0.382 0.352 0.358 0.342
Notes: All regressions are probit. Dependent variables are dummy  variables for holding a job in a rural area, either in a hospital or in a health centre (columns
1–3)  and holding a job in a rural health centre (columns 4–6). The sample includes only nurses who  hold a job in the public sector. Results present the
marginal effects of each factor, or the marginal impact of each predictor on the probability of working in a rural area (columns 1–3) or on the probability
of  working in a rural health centre (columns 4–6). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Controls include a dummy for having had a health-related
ﬁeld/profession as ﬁrst choice of study, monthly (log) salary, age, male, black, married, having a child, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent
places  income as the ﬁrst thing to look for in a job, and a synthetic index capturing positive attitude towards rural lifestyle. Signiﬁcance levels:
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.3. Dedicated nurses vs. nurses by default
We  know from the baseline survey that not all nurses in the sample chose to embrace this profession full-heartedly. In
act, Table 10 shows that only 42% wanted to study nursing, with just an additional 18% who wanted to embrace a health
rofession looking after patients (e.g. doctors, physiotherapists, etc.). For the rest of the sample, Table 10 shows the variety
f studies and careers that some individuals would have preferred to nursing. In particular, many originally wanted not only
o embark on a professional carer where they would not have dealt with patients at all, but also where ﬁnancial returns
ould potentially have been higher (e.g. accounting, law, marketing, etc.). We  could hypothesise that these individuals, who
re health care providers not by choice but by default, are likely to care less about patients and their welfare than those who
anted to become health care providers above anything else in the ﬁrst place. Indeed, we  ﬁnd that the donations to patients
re slightly lower for those nurses “by default”, who give on average 35.8% of their endowment compared to 39.2% for the
urses “by vocation” (p < 0.058).
Therefore, the self-selection of dedicated nurses into rural jobs may  partly reﬂect the fact that the nurses generous
owards patients in the DG are also those who were really motivated by a health-related career where they could serve
atients. Although we did control for this variable in all econometric speciﬁcations, some collinearity issue might remain.
ubmitting our results to a more robust test, we re-estimated our speciﬁcation with all controls with the sub-sample of
ndividuals who were motivated to work in the health sector, that is those whose ﬁrst choice of study was  either nursing
N = 144), medicine (N = 36) or another health-related ﬁeld or profession (N = 27).
Table 11 reports the results of these estimations, which conﬁrm the existence of some association between relevant
ltruism in the lab and career choices. Even though, unlike what was found in the whole sample, the experimental measure
f pro-social motives towards patients no longer predict the choice made by nurses to work in a rural area in any facility
able 10
elf-reported ﬁrst choice of study.
N %
Nursing 144 41.98
Medicine 36 10.50
Other health-related studiesa 27 7.87
Social professionsb 33 9.62
Business/law 37 10.79
Otherc 55 16.03
Didn’t know/answer 11 3.21
TOTAL 343 100
a Physiotherapy, nutrition, etc.
b Teaching, psychology, etc.
c Engineering, mathematics, physics, etc.
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Table  11
pro-social motives and choice of rural jobs amongst “motivated” nurses.
Any job in a rural area Job in a rural health centre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donation to patient 0.238 0.329**
(0.199) (0.149)
Donation to poor 0.172 0.263**
(0.166) (0.116)
Donation to peer 0.253 0.138
(0.205) (0.147)
Born  rural 0.396*** 0.399*** 0.398*** 0.104* 0.111* 0.117*
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.063) (0.061) (0.062)
Trained rural 0.429*** 0.442*** 0.427*** 0.424*** 0.445*** 0.409***
(0.070) (0.072) (0.070) (0.065) (0.066) (0.063)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 203 203 203 203 203 203
Log-likelihood −75.56 −75.75 −75.51 −70.50 −70.49 −72.74
Pseudo R2 0.430 0.429 0.431 0.395 0.395 0.376
Notes: All regressions are probit. Dependent variables are dummy variables for holding a job in a rural area, either in any health care facility (columns 1–3)
and  holding a job in a rural health centre (columns 4–6). The sample includes only nurses who indicated that their ﬁrst choice of study was in relation to
a  health profession/ﬁeld (e.g. nursing, medicine, physiotherapy, etc.). Results present the marginal effects of each factor, or the marginal impact of each
predictor on the probability of working in a rural area in any facility (columns 1–3) or on the probability of working in a rural health centre (columns 4–6).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Controls include monthly (log) salary, age, male, black, married, having a child, a dummy variable indicating
whether the respondent places income as the ﬁrst thing to look for in a job, and a synthetic index capturing positive attitude towards rural lifestyle.
Signiﬁcance levels:* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
(column 1), dedication towards patients is positively associated with holding a job in a rural health centre (column 4), as is
a pro-poor attitude (column 5). In fact, these marginal effects are even stronger in that sub-group, with a 10% increase in
the donation to patients (poor people) in the DG associated with an increase in the probability of choosing a job in a rural
health centre by 3.29 (2.63) percentage points. In the whole sample, the same effects were respectively estimated to be 2.40
and 1.82. Finally, the speciﬁcations including measures of generosity towards peer (columns 3 and 6) conﬁrm the lack of
signiﬁcance of that less speciﬁc experimental measure of pro-social motives on career choices.
These results overall suggest that, in a group of more intrinsically motivated and dedicated individuals, altruism (as
measured in the lab) may  only be discriminating enough for the more dramatic career decisions, involving greater self-
sacriﬁce.
7. Discussion and conclusion
This study presents the ﬁrst empirical test of the role of pro-social preferences measured in the lab in the choice of jobs
in deprived rural areas. Applied to the context of young nurses in South Africa, it explores the extent to which pro-social
motives observed in the lab are predictors of career choices.
The ﬁndings show that health workers who display higher levels of dedication towards patients in the lab are more likely
to choose to work in rural areas, where their personal and professional lives are objectively more difﬁcult. This result was
particularly strong and consistent when looking at the relationship between dedication towards patients in the lab and rural
jobs in health centres. We  also found consistent evidence that generosity towards poor people in the lab was  associated with
choosing to work in a rural health centre. Two reasons probably explain this stronger association. First, the beneﬁts derived
by patients from the presence of a nurse are likely to be even greater than in hospitals. The latter are indeed typically staffed
with several doctors and nurses, while it is not rare for nurses to be the only health care professional in health centres.
Second, rural health centres are also located in more remote areas, where geographic barriers to access to alternative health
care providers are greater. The presence of a professional nurse therefore makes a signiﬁcant difference to the life of potential
patients in the catchment area, more so than for rural hospitals.
These ﬁndings have potential policy implications in South Africa. To ensure that a higher proportion of nurses are willing
to choose rural posts, the recruitment processes of nursing students could try and ascertain the extent to which potential
candidates show signs of dedication towards patients, or a commitment to improving patients’ wellbeing. Alternatively,
assuming that dedication to patients can be nurtured, nurses’ curricula and experience during their studies could be adapted
to cultivate positive attitudes towards patients.Finally, we found no evidence that pro-social preferences not speciﬁc to the particular decision-making context of nurses
were relevant to their labour supply decisions. Speciﬁcally, generic altruistic decisions observed in a standard DG where
the dictator sends money to fellow students, was never a predictor of job choices outside the lab. This ﬁnding suggests that
lightly framed experiments might more relevant to explore the impact of social preferences on decisions made outside of
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he lab. This is particularly true for the investigation of the role of other-regarding preferences in a particular social setting,
hich can only be introduced in experimental economics by abandoning some degree of abstraction.
This study contributes to the limited evidence on the relationships between decisions observed in the lab and choices
ade in real life, although the strength of the relationship observed here might be due to the particular characteristics of the
opulation studied (nurses). With experimental (Jacobsen et al., 2011) and anecdotal (Miers et al., 2007; Shaw and Degazon,
008) evidence suggesting that nurses are likely to be more altruistic than the general population, does it make studying
he role of social preferences in career decisions in that population less relevant or interesting? We  believe not. In fact, if
nything, detecting a relationship between pro-social motivation in the lab and career choices might be more difﬁcult (and
herefore more meaningful when detected) in a more altruistic population where one might observe more less variation in
ltruistic behaviour in the lab. What is more speciﬁc to nurses however, is the fact that part of their motivation to work is
irectly linked to social preferences, i.e. helping and serving others, more speciﬁcally patients. It is precisely the reason why
hey were a particularly relevant and interesting population in which to study relationships between social preferences in
he lab and career decisions outside the lab. It would be interesting for further research to study the extent to which one
an observe the same link between social preferences in the lab and career decisions made by individuals who  are likely to
hoose their profession partly to beneﬁt others (medical doctors, teachers).
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